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Abstract 
Separation of design from construction has led to serious coordination and communication 
problems in our industry, which are unlikely to be resolved by BIM without significant 
changes. Although collaborative design and construction methods have been developed for 
major projects, over 80% of all construction projects still suffer from a divisive risk 
management culture, which perpetuates problems of integration between briefing, design 
and construction. Design-led procurement facilitates the engagement of trade and specialist 
contractors in the briefing and design process. Designers lead the supervision of work on site, 
thereby bridging the gaps between briefing, design and construction. Network governance 
supported by Project Insurance, instead of Professional Indemnity Insurance, facilitates the 
optimization between briefing, design and construction. A new paradigm has to be 
established to disentangle long established routines across the design and construction 
professions.  
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Public sector procurement in the UK 
In May 2011, the Government’s Construction Strategy was published with the intention of 
reforming the procurement of public sector projects1 (Cabinet Office, 2011). The strategy sets 
out principles for new procurement models to allow designers, consultants and contractors to 
work in a more collaborative and integrated way. A central tenet is the introduction of 
project-wide insurance covering all parties, enabling the sharing of liabilities, and up to a 20 
per cent cost reduction by avoiding contractor charges for bearing risks passed onto them by 
the client.  
This paper explores the underlying reasons why the UK construction industry is not 
collaborative, and presents alternative procurement models and insurance arrangements that 
may help overcome this. The first section explores the historical reasons for fragmentation in 
the construction industry. The second opens up a discussion on the complexity of design and 
construction processes.  A critique of current construction procurement methods is then 
presented, highlighting their governance shortcomings. The final section sets out design-led 
                                                     
1 The UK government is the largest client of the construction industry, accounting for about 
40% of the industry’s workload Cabinet Office. (2011, May 31). Government Construction 




procurement as an alternative, harnessing the benefits of network governance and project 
insurance arrangements.  
Separation of design from construction: a historical perspective 
In early seventeenth century England, Master Masons were responsible for building design 
and construction (Crinson and Lubbock, 1994). During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (Wilton-Ely, 1977, the interdisciplinary architectural designer emerged. The 
establishment of architecture as a profession can be seen as an attempt to distinguish the 
Architect from the other building trades. In the eighteenth century the development of 
distinct modes of entry to architecture through pupillage did just this, providing training in 
drawing and administration, whilst omitting the practical knowledge and skills of the building 
trades (Crinson and Lubbock, 1994). This was cemented in 1834 with the founding of the 
Institute of British Architects (later the RIBA)2 to protect the professional interests of 
architects (ibid). Subsequently many other professional institutions were set up, further 
fragmenting the construction industry (ibid).  
Discussing problems of institutionalism due to professionalization, Murdoch and Hughes 
(2008) note that participants of a project team come with predefined conceptions of their and 
others’ roles. Scott (1995) asserts that professions exhibit normative, cognitive and regulative 
control – three pillars of institutions. Professionals exert normative control by identifying 
roles and responsibilities of actors. Cognitive control outlines who we are and what we are 
expected to do in a given situation, thus stressing the importance of social identities. 
Regulative controls set out rules, monitor actions, sanctions, rewards and punishments.  The 
RIBA outlines the responsibilities of architects – drawing, design and supervision (normative 
control), monitors architectural education in universities to formalise training (cognitive 
control) and controlled entry into the profession through registration and protection of title 
(regulative control). As a result Institutionalization causes inflexibility within the project 
organization, whilst the project environment demands flexibility due to uncertainty.  
Another reason for the formation of the architectural profession was industrialization3. Cross 
(2011) suggests that in craft-based societies, designing is firmly linked to making, whereas in 
industrialized societies making does not start until design is complete. The general contractor 
emerged in the UK construction industry around 1870 as a result of increased specialization 
due to industrial revolution; this relieved architects from the burden of close site supervision, 
enabling them to spend more time on design (Hughes, 1992).  The general contractor 
                                                     
2 The institute gained its Royal Charter in 1837 to form the Royal Institute of British Architects 
(RIBA) (Crinson and Lubbock, 1994). 
3 Crinson and Lubbock (1994) record that there were individuals who resisted the split 
between design and construction. For example, William Lethaby emphasized that the building 
craft has to be learnt through direct handling of tools and materials.  He saw architecture not 
only as a form of training in the arts and design, but encompassing the crafts. 
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developed a financial relationship with design and remodelled the tripartite relationship of 
client, designer and craftsmen (Wilton-Ely, 1977). Furthermore, Hughes (1992) suggests that, 
unlike the Master Mason, very few people can grasp the variety and complexity of 
technologies in modern construction.  Hence, there is a need for coordination and 
management between different specializations as well as between design and construction. A 
recent survey by the RIBA (2016) highlights that collaboration and efficient administration 
remain priority issues for architects’ today. 
The design process 
It is imperative for designers to work with specialist trades to gain technical know-how of 
components while formulating building-designs. Through various case studies, Cross (2011) 
has demonstrated that good designers operate seamlessly across different levels of detail – 
from high-level goals to low-level physical principles. Furthermore, in his experiment of 
redesigning a bathroom, Eastman (1970, cited in Lawson, 1983, p. 33) concluded that 
experienced designers learnt the nature of the design problem simultaneously while 
identifying a range of possible solutions.  Similarly, Cross (2011) suggests that in the process 
of designing, the problem and the solution develop together. Thus the design evolves as more 
understanding of the problem is developed. 
Hughes and Murdoch (2001) undertook detailed analyses of nine plans of work, including the 
RIBA Plan of Work, and carried out consultations with focus groups representing all aspects of 
the construction industry. They concluded that most plans of work are targeted at producing 
sufficient information to enable decision making at a particular stage. Hence, plans of work 
are output focused. These findings are concurrent with Lawson’s (1983) analysis of the RIBA 
Plan of Work. He suggests that it does not map the design process, as it does not allow for 
iteration between work stages.  Even the simplest map of the design process must allow for a 
return loop to all preceding functions.  Thus, a tension exists between working in accordance 
with a plan of work, which is often linked to fee stages, and the iterative nature of the design 
process. 
Lawson (1983), using the analogy of a team game, suggests that co-operation is crucial in the 
design process, as the needs of many stakeholders must be satisfied.  Design should not be 
seen as a personal, cognitive process of the individual designer, but rather a social process of 
interaction with other participants. As Bucciarelli (1994, cited in Cross, 2011, p.20) argues, 
design involves negotiation involving different participants, each with their specific 
knowledge and understanding of the object that is being designed. Thus, governance 
structures should allow coordination through social interaction, even if the parties are not 
bound by contractual obligations. 
Complexity in construction projects 
Construction projects involve many actors during different phases, including clients, 
designers, consultants, contractors and specialist trades.  Cherns and Bryant (1984) propose 
that a temporary multi-organization (TMO) is established through which representatives from 
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different organizations come together for a particular project and disperse after its 
completion. The temporary nature of construction projects calls for differentiation in two 
dimensions: horizontal differentiation between various organizations and vertical 
differentiation between structural levels (Baccarini, 1996).  Construction projects face 
organizational complexity through horizontal (professions) and vertical differentiation (tiers of 
supply chain). The governance mechanism needs to coordinate and control 
interdependencies amongst these differentiations. Interdependence of operations across 
organizational boundaries gives rise to organizational complexity.  
Complexity results in interdependencies between the constituent parts. Thompson (2003) 
discusses three types of interdependency in ascending order of complexity: pooled, 
sequential or reciprocal.  Pooled interdependence relies on the contribution of each part to 
the whole. When output of one part becomes input of another, they are sequentially 
interdependent. Reciprocal interdependence exists when the output of each part becomes 
input for other parts; architect, structural engineer, services engineer and cost consultants 
would use each other’s outputs to produce their work. Reciprocal interdependencies are most 
complex and highly evident in the design and construction process (Walker, 2007). Thompson 
(2003) further suggests that reciprocal interdependence needs coordination by mutual 
adjustment and involves transmission of new information during the process.  This increases 
the burden on decision-making and communication. Thus, organizational complexity in 
construction projects will prove challenging for the governance of construction projects. 
Current procurement methods - a critique 
Eccles (1981), through his interviews of house builders in Massachusetts, has noted the 
existence of a “quasi-firm” in the construction industry. In general contracting, the main 
contractor works with a small number of specialist sub-contractors, in an“inside” contracting 
system.  This form of governance balances advantages of market and bilateral structures as 
close coordination and control is achieved along with some degree of competition.  He further 
asserts that a decision taken within the “inside” contracting mode is a trade-off between the 
criticality of the sub-contractors’ works within the main programme and lower construction 
costs resulting from a scale of economies. Thus, internal contracting induces process 
innovation. However, lack of product and material innovation due to bias for process 
innovations is identified as a defective incentive of the “inside” contracting system 
(Williamson, 1975). Assurance of continuous relationships is essential for suppliers to make 
transaction specific investments in equipment, systems and employee skills. Internal 
contracting limits the number of sub-contractors. However, it does not pose incentives for 
product innovation as there is no guarantee of continuous work over long periods of time to 
recoup investments. In response, Eccles (1981) argues that as plans and specifications are 




The main contractor may foster product innovation through design-build procurement who 
has ‘single point responsibility for delivering the required building and associated services in 
accordance with defined standards and conditions’ (Bennet et al. 1996: 3). The single point 
responsibility ensures integration of design and construction, enhancing buildability and 
increased certainty of product delivery.  However, design-build projects still suffer from poor 
design quality and lack flexibility to incorporate client changes (Anumba and Evbuomwan, 
1997). Through a  survey of 330 construction projects Bennett et al. (1996) argue that design 
quality is not undermined by a contractor’s commercial interests alone, but by discontinuity in 
design responsibility which sees partly developed designs handed over to the contractor. In 
their survey, the best performance of quality expectations were in those design-build projects 
where Employers’ Requirements were minimal. Hence, it is not just the discontinuity between 
design and construction that affects quality, the discontinuity in design responsibility also has 
its effects. 
Latham (1994) argues that trust is essential to the improvement of performance in the 
construction industry. Citing a survey of 180 major construction companies, Lathem (1994)  
shows that there is a clear appetite across the industry to develop a partnership approach to 
risk management (ibid). Only 15% of respondents were in favour of apportioning risk to single 
parties. If the performance of the supply chain is to be enhanced, the governance mechanism 
needs to be reconsidered. The governance structure should promote coordination through 
social interaction amongst parties, not be legally bound. 
Network Governance 
Williamson (1979) describes governance as an institutional framework within which 
transactions are decided. This framework refers to the regulative lens of institutional theory 
proposed by Scott (1995) where control is exerted through rules and regulations. Eriksson 
(2006) refers to governance mechanisms as alternative ways to influence organizations 
involved to establish control and co-ordination. Thus the governance mechanism integrates 
differentiation and interdependencies through control and co-ordination. 
Powell (1990) proposes comparative models of market, hierarchy and network. He 
substantiates his model of a network through examples of various industries ranging from 
traditional craft to technologically advanced.  He asserts that the network is a viable form of 
economic organization and is characterized by reciprocal patterns of communication and 
exchanges. He argues against the idea of hybrid forms occurring along the continuum of the 
market and hierarchies, and suggests that there are distinct alternative forms of governance 
demonstrated through collaboration and reciprocity.  He concludes three critical components 
of a network: 
1. Know-how – Tacit knowledge is an important incentive for craft based 
industries.   
2. Demand for speed – Flexibility and fast access to information in a dynamic 
world.  Information exchanged in the network is “freer” than hierarchy and 
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“thicker” than market. Information is open for interpretation and thus can 
generate new insights. 
3. Trust – High probability of future association motivates network participants to 
cooperate.  Need for hierarchical supervision is limited as opportunism is 
discouraged. Quality is emphasized over quantity.   
 
Fenton and Pettigrew (2000) applied network theory of governance by Jones et al. (1997) to 
study the organization of Arup. They found that some employees were very active within the 
network and others were not.  The former came in frequent contact with each other and 
formed closed ties leading to over-embeddedness. It was difficult to integrate the latter due 
to under-embeddedness.   Thus, in order to optimize embeddedness, the social mechanism 
should be modified to restrict as well as extend access. They also argue that leadership and 
incentive systems can be useful alongside social control mechanisms. Incentives can motivate 
employees within a network to cooperate. Leadership can aid to balance strong and weak 
ties. Leaders at the hub of strong ties can influence diffusion of information within a network.  
Network governance exerts control through social mechanisms and can influence 
development of trust among network members. Lack of trust is considered one of the key 
reasons for adversarial attitudes within the construction industry. Network governance 
proposes benefits of coordination through effective communication. However, network 
governance is not widely used within the construction project environment (Rose & Manley, 
2012).  
Design-led procurement method (proposal) 
Design-led procurement aims to harness the potential of design by bridging the separation 
between design and construction through network governance. In this procurement method, 
designers work directly with specialist/trade contractors without intermediation of a main 
contractor.  Trade/specialist contractors hold direct contracts with the client and their work 
on site is supervised by the designers. Hiley and Khaidzir (1999) report that architect-led 
construction management procurement method in Germany has proved successful.  Hans 
Haenlein Architects have employed design-led procurement in various projects (Haenlein, 
2007a).  Architects deal directly with trade/specialist contractors and hold separate contracts 
with these contractors, consultants and the client.   
The School projects – an example 
Patel (2011) analysed two projects for a school client to refurbish chemistry laboratories: C 
Block 1 (phase 1) and C Block 2 (phase 2).  The project details of both cases are given in Table 
1 (at the end of paper). These projects were selected as they offer polarity as described by 
Voss et al. (2002).  The architect, consultants and trade/specialist contractors were the same 
in both the cases except for the laboratory equipment contractor.  The works involved in both 
projects were largely similar, key difference being in the quantity of work.  While C Block 1 
was procured through the traditional procurement route, C Block 2 was procured through the 
design-led procurement route.   
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C Block 2 was 22% cheaper and finished within less time as compared to C Block 1. Cost 
certainty existed in C Block 2 by the use of an ‘open book’ change management system. 
Design-led procurement gave rise to conditions necessary for emergence and survival of 
network governance.  Social control of project culture, reputation and inclusive restricted 
access induced cooperation amongst network members.  Communication analysis provides 
evidence of enhanced coordination between design and construction in the design-led 
project. Defects were attended promptly by trade contractors; their commitment increased 
due to proximity of the client through site meetings. It is noteworthy that no explicit financial 
incentives were offered to contractors for cooperative behaviour.   
Lead organization network governance 
While undertaking design-led procurement for C Block 2, the client insisted that the project 
should be managed by the architect. Inputs from network members like structural consultant, 
electrical and mechanical trade contractor were disparate.  Also, each member did not 
possess requisite skills to coordinate their work with others.  Hence, network governance had 
to be brokered.  Lead organization network governance (Provan and Kenis, 2007) was 
employed to facilitate network level coordination. The architect acted as lead organization 
and undertook the coordination of network level activities and decisions. Disintermediation of 
the main contractor increased interaction between designers and trade/specialist contractors, 
as well as between trade/specialist contractors 
Along with design leadership, this form of network governance ensured continuity of design 
responsibility as well as integration of design and construction. Design remained the sole 
responsibility of the architect throughout the project.  Buildability knowledge and 
specifications were developed by the architect through discussion and coordination with 
trade/specialist contractors.  
The client placed the competence of the architect at the forefront for the design-led 
procurement.  While outlining current difficulties faced by the profession and possibilities of 
future development, Hiley and Khaidzir (1999) acknowledge the need for a change in attitude, 
knowledge, education and training. Architectural education should emphasize the need for 
appreciating technical knowledge of other disciplines.  The attitude of passing technical risks 
onto the main contractor should be discouraged.  Capabilities to manage the interfaces 
should be developed through education and practical training. The medical Teaching Hospital 
model could provide the necessary education, research and practice metaphors for the future 
professional practices in the built environment (Hans Haenlein Architects, 2009). Such a 
facility would aim to explore the interfaces between practice, research and postgraduate 
education in Design and Construction and facilitate their development in a multidisciplinary 
context. 
This example is not aimed at promoting one particular profession to lead construction 
projects.  The main argument is to achieve integration of design and construction through 
design leadership. Network governance is not attributed to design-led procurement only.  
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Future research should examine the compatibility of network governance with other 
procurement routes. 
Professional Indemnity Insurance (PII) versus Project Insurance 
On their appointment on C Block 2, one of the contractors raised concerns over the need for a 
general insurance policy to cover claims against the client for accidents, or the inability to 
establish blame regarding a fault with any of the trade/specialist contractors. The client’s 
insurer confirmed that their insurance policy covers all these risks.   
Project Insurance, taken out by the client for everyone involved in a project, as is the norm in 
Germany, provides much more cost effective insurance cover for everyone than separate 
insurance arrangements for each professional and trade organization. At a stroke it 
overcomes the litigious basis of the construction industry. If the UK construction industry 
were to move from practice-based Pll to project based insurance, small practices would be 
able to network much more easily and be appointed for larger projects (Haenlein, 2007b). 
RIBA Small Practices Group position paper for public sector procurement highlighted the 
insurance requirement as one of the barriers to access public sector market and suggested 
adopting project-based insurance (RIBA, 2011)  .  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to explore a procurement route, which aims to integrate design 
and construction.  The literature review demonstrates constraints of the various procurement 
routes for being able to deal satisfactorily with the organizational complexity of construction 
projects.  Product innovation is biased against process optimization.  However, the potential 
of ‘design’ to improve efficiency is understated. Designers work simultaneously at different 
levels of detail.  In light of technological advancements in building systems, input of specialist 
contractors is necessary during the early design stages.  Designers need to manage the 
interfaces between these systems and ensure the buildability of their design.  Designing is a 
social process of achieving consensus of different interests. Professionalization creates 
boundaries for roles and further increases the separation of design from construction. Design-
led procurement offers the opportunity for designers and trade/specialist contractors to work 
together from inception through to construction.  The effectiveness of this procurement route 
is complemented by network governance.  Network governance balances the conflicting 
demands of specialization and integration posed by construction projects. Structural 
embeddedness of network members enables social control of their behaviour.  Leadership 
addresses problems of over-embeddedness and under-embeddedness by managing strong 
ties and bridging weak ties for cross-fertilization.  Designers can assume leadership of the 
network to coordinate inputs of various members even at the construction stage. Design 
evolves over time.  Hence, continuity of design responsibility is paramount to ensure quality.  
Cooperation of trade/specialist contractors is vital for product innovation and efficiency. 




We are grateful to Will Hughes for his guidance in exploring the ideas presented in the paper. 
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1. Contract period is as mentioned in the contract document 
2. Actual completion is calculated from start on site to the issue of Practical Completion. 
3. Defects cleared period is calculated from issue of practical completion certificate to the issue of Making Good Defects 
4. Fees are the professional fees.  They are calculated as percentage of construction costs 
5. Cost index is calculated by assuming C Block 1 as 100% and taking ratio of cumulative costs of construction and professional fees. 
